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Depending on the Thick 
Debbie Roberts 
  
 
‘What [Moore] really wants to insist on, I think, is an inadequacy claim: what is left of language after we 
cull the ethical terms is in principle inadequate to the task of ascribing the properties we ascribe using the 
ethical terms.’ Frank Jackson 
 
 
Abstract:  
The claim that the normative depends on the non-normative is just as entrenched in 
metanormative theory as the clam that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. It’s 
widely held to be a genuine truism, a conceptual truth that operates as a constraint on 
competence with normative concepts. Call it the dependence constraint. I argue that this status is 
unwarranted. While it is true that the normative is dependent it is not a genuine truism, or a 
conceptual truth, that it depends on the non-normative. I argue for the following inadequacy 
claim: that when we cull all the normative terms from our language, and so the concepts that they 
stand for, what we will be left with will not necessarily be sufficient to adequately describe, 
conceptualise or represent what it is that we are supposed to be making normative judgments in virtue of. 
This has implications for both ascriptive and metaphysical understandings of the dependence 
constraint, and the potential to radically reshape the dialectic in metanormative theory. 
 
 
I. Introduction  
It’s commonly thought that there is a very close connection between the non-normative 
and the normative, which is not the merely modal one captured by supervenience.1 But 
what is this connection precisely? Here is one dominant picture: the normative is 
dependent: it has to be appropriately anchored in what the relevant thing is like. It cannot 
‘float free’. So an action can’t be brutely right, or a person merely good, they must have 
other features that make them right or good respectively. A crucial part of this picture is 
that the features that do the ‘making’ are non-normative features.  
 
On this view the normative depends on the non-normative. This is widely held to be a 
truism. Many take it to be an a priori conceptual truth that operates as a conceptual 
constraint on normative judgments, in much the same way as the supervenience of the 
normative does. Call it, then, the dependence constraint.  
 
As in the case of the supervenience thesis, there are not many who challenge the 
dependence constraint. Of those who do, some have challenged the strength of the 
connection between the normative and the non-normative. They have argued that the 
dependence relation is not one that holds with necessity (Dancy, 2004; Zangwill 2008).2 
Others have argued that though the relation holds with necessity, the non-normative 
only makes up part of the dependence base. Fundamental normative laws, or bridge 
principles linking the normative to the non-normative, make up the rest (Enoch, 2011; 
Scanlon, 2014). Still others have argued that though the laws are not themselves part of 
the base, they ‘underlie’ the dependence relation (Wilsch 2015).3 And Leary 
(forthcoming) has recently challenged the standard picture by arguing that there are 
                                                
1 I’m using ‘normative’ in the broad sense which includes the evaluative. 
2 Fine (2012) challenges the nature of the relation in a different sort of way, claiming that it is one that 
holds with normative, but not metaphysical necessity. Cf Bader (forthcoming). I’m going to leave aside the 
2 Fine (2012) challenges the nature of the relation in a different sort of way, claiming that it is one that 
holds with normative, but not metaphysical necessity. Cf Bader (forthcoming). I’m going to leave aside the 
issue of the nature of the necessity, or if the relation is indeed one that holds with necessity 
3 Cited in Leary (forthcoming). 
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hybrid normative-natural properties that act as the ‘double-sided tape’ sticking the 
normative and the natural together.  
 
What remains under-scrutinised is the assumption that there are two distinct realms with 
one, the non-normative, more fundamental than the other at least when it comes to 
particular normative facts.4 5 This assumption is made even by those who hold that 
normative is a subset of the descriptive or natural.6 
 
Although I have not made it explicit, I’ve implied that the dependence relation that I am 
interested in is metaphysical. But I’m also interested in claims about how we make, or 
ought to make, normative judgments, and so how we conceptualise, represent, or pick 
out properties in the world. Indeed, my main point can be illustrated using the Jackson 
quote above.  I’m sympathetic to the inadequacy claim that Jackson ascribes to Moore. 
However, my focus here is a slightly different inadequacy claim: that when we cull all the 
normative terms from our language, and so the concepts that they stand for, what we will 
be left with will not necessarily be sufficient to adequately describe, conceptualise or 
represent what it is that we are supposed to be making normative judgments in virtue of. My aim is 
to show that, for all that we can tell from our normative concepts, it is possible that this 
inadequacy claim is true. This has important implications for both claims about how we 
do, or ought to make normative judgments and, I argue, claims about the metaphysics of 
the normative.  
 
I proceed as follows: In §II I spend some time on preliminaries and on clarifying my 
target, particularly concerning how we should characterise the dependence base, and I 
distinguish different ways that the dependence constraint can be understood. In §III and 
§IV I show why none of the different ways of understanding the dependence constraint 
can plausibly be held to be a conceptual truth, or the truism that many take it to be. I 
conclude in §V. 
 
 
II. Preliminaries 
Some might think that the dependence constraint is entailed by the supervenience of the 
normative on the non-normative. This is not the case. Supervenience, strictly speaking, is 
a purely modal claim about necessary co-variance. In this context it is, roughly, that there 
cannot be a normative difference without a non-normative difference. It is true, 
historically, that many have associated this supervenience claim with the dependence 
claim. However, supervenience does not entail dependence. Those who make explicit the 
distinction between the supervenience and the dependence of the normative make clear 
that the relation is the reverse: it is normative dependence that is meant to explain 
                                                
4 Väyrynen (2009, 2013) subjects this assumption to some scrutiny. Dancy also hints (1995, 1999) that 
things might not be like this, but does not make explicit the alternative or defend it. Leary (forthcoming) 
effectively challenges the sharpness of the distinction between the two realms, but the natural remains 
fundamental on her picture. Sturgeon holds that normative properties are natural properties, but natural in 
their own right and not natural because they can be reduced to some other set of natural properties. In his 
(2009) he expressly does not explain supervenience by appealing to any kind of dependence relation 
between normative properties and other natural properties. He seems to leave open the possibility that 
(some) normative properties are fundamental. See especially pp. 61, pp. 69n36, pp. 71-72.  
5 For views that hold that there are fundamental general normative facts (principles) see section IV. 
6 The non-normative is also characterised as the descriptive and the natural. Metaethicists are typically 
happy to use these terms interchangeably, as if not much hangs on the differences. See Sturgeon (2009, pp. 
70n37). Sturgeon (2009) is an outlier in not assuming that the normative depends on a subset of the 
descriptive or natural. 
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normative supervenience (Smith, 2004; Dancy, 1993, ch 5). I will not assume, here, that 
the supervenience claim is true. I have argued elsewhere that there are reasons to doubt 
this claim, and at the very least to doubt that it is an a priori conceptual truth (Roberts, 
forthcomingb). 
 
Until recently though, supervenience in ethics was taken to be an asymmetric 
dependence relation (Mackie, 1977, p.41; Hare, 1984). More recently, and as just noted 
above, the supposed dependence relation between the normative and the non-normative 
has been taken to explain supervenience. So the entrenched nature of the supervenience 
claim in ethics perhaps goes some way towards explaining the status the dependence 
constraint is held to have. 
 
The assumption that there are these two distinct realms, the normative and the non-
normative, with one is more fundamental than the other is underscrutinised at least 
partly because so many hold the dependence constraint to be a conceptual truth, or a 
genuine truism7. It strikes people as manifestly evident that the normative depends on 
the non-normative, and thus that it would just be incredible to deny this (Rosen, 
forthcoming, pp.4; Väyrynen, 2009, pp. 310).  
 
Here are some examples of this view in action, my italics:  
 
‘In general, when we make a moral judgment we judge not just that something  has 
a moral property but that it has a moral property because it has some natural 
property. This is a fundamental principle of our moral thought. …[W]e cannot judge that 
an act is barely wrong; we must judge that it is wrong because of some natural 
property of the act.’ (Zangwill, 2008, pp. 109-10)8 
 
‘It is simply incoherent to suppose that evaluative claims could be barely true. 
Evaluative claims must always be made true by other claims…The fact that 
evaluative claims cannot be barely true is reflected in ordinary evaluative 
practice… [E]valuative claims cannot be barely true but have to be made true by 
facts about naturalistic  features…’ (Smith, 2004, pp. 225-9) 
 
 ‘[I]f something is “good” then that must be so “in virtue of” its being a “certain 
 way”, that is, having certain factual [naturalistic] properties.” (Kim, 1993, pp. 235) 
 
‘Even if moral properties are not themselves natural, their possession presupposes 
that of certain natural properties as their basis.’ (Audi, 1997, pp. 117) 
 
Expressivists think along similar lines: 
 
 ‘The whole purpose for which we moralise… is to choose, commend, rank, 
 approve, forbid things on the basis of their natural properties.’ (Blackburn, 1985, pp.  
 137) 
                                                
7 By truism I just mean something that is so obvious or self-evident that it’s hardly worth mentioning. I 
don’t simply mean ‘something that lots of people think is true’. You might think the dependence constraint 
is a truism without thinking it to be a conceptual truth. The reverse is also true, but those who hold the 
dependence constraint to be a conceptual truth also take it to be a truism. It’s more difficult to say 
precisely what a conceptual truth is or would be, but I’m working with the admittedly rough idea that if 
something is a conceptual truth then our concepts don’t permit the possibility of its falsity.  
8 The ‘in general’ is important. Zangwill notes that he is leaving aside the issue of thick concepts.   
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On Blackburn’s view, the ethical agent can be usefully compared to a device whose 
function is to take certain inputs and deliver certain outputs. Inputs are ethically salient 
naturalistic features that we believe to be present. Outputs are certain attitudes, or 
pressure on attitudes, or a favouring of policies, choices and actions (Blackburn, 1998, 
pp. 48-8).9  
 
Gibbard (2003, ch. 5) argues that anyone who thinks and plans is committed to the 
supervenience of the normative on the natural. On Gibbard’s view, this is an a priori 
practical claim. To accept it is what we commit to by planning any aspect of our lives. 
Supervenience comes with dependence.  Plans must be couched, says Gibbard, in terms 
of features we can recognise. These ‘recognitional properties’ are, in a liberal sense, 
natural properties. We use ‘recognitionally grounded concepts’ to pick out these 
recognitional properties (the kinds of properties that compose prosaic facts). A concept 
is recognitionally grounded if it is composable, finitely or infinitely, from recognitional 
concepts.  
 
In planning what to do, Gibbard claims, we must stick to the facts – the prosaic, natural 
facts, free of all hint of plan-ladeness (Gibbard, 2003, pp. 104-107). The dependence 
constraint translated into Gibbard’s terms then is simply the claim that we must plan in 
virtue of the prosaically factual, non-normative, features that we take things to have. 
 
There are of course important differences between the views canvassed above, but all of 
these authors appeal to some kind of dependence relation holding between the 
normative and some, at least prima facie distinct, realm that is more fundamental in some 
respect. Some, like Zangwill, Smith, Gibbard and Blackburn make explicit that the 
dependence constraint they have in mind is meant to be a conceptual truth. In general, 
though, metaethicists seem to be of the view some version of the dependence constraint, 
is a genuine truism whose denial is just incredible. 
 
I have characterised the dependence base as the non-normative so far, but in the 
literature it is variously construed. Some examples: the non-normative, the non-
evaluative, the natural, and the descriptive. One way to show that the dependence 
constraint is not the conceptual constraint or the truism that so many think it is, would 
be to show that the differences amongst these construals matter, and that there is no one 
formulation of the dependence constraint that everyone agrees on independently of prior 
metanormative commitments.  
 
Sturgeon (2009) does just this for the supervenience thesis. He shows that there is no 
version, for all the common ways in which the supervenience base is construed, which 
everyone should accept regardless of their metaethical commitments. And, turning to the 
dependence constraint, Väyrynen (2009) has argued persuasively that the claim that 
normative facts hold solely in virtue of natural facts is one for which there is no non-
parochial justification.  
 
Perhaps the same could be shown for all other common construals of the base.10 I think 
that it could, but I will not pursue this route here. This is because there is a response to 
Sturgeon’s arguments in the supervenience case that may work equally well in the 
                                                
9 Blackburn emphasises that this is not to say that we are always aware that this is what is going on, or that 
this process is a one-way street. Often things on the ‘output’ side will influence what the ‘inputs’ are.  
10 Väyrynen (2009, pp. 310) suggests that this is likely at least in the case of the non-evaluative.  
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dependence case (McPherson, 2012; Roberts, forthcomingb). That is, there may be a 
version of the dependence constraint that is a plausible candidate for the one that 
everyone should agree to.  
 
Suppose we understand the dependence base as follows: Characterise a base property as 
any property that is not normativity involving.11 A normativity involving property is to be 
understood as either a sui generis normative property or one whose real definition 
ineliminably mentions such properties. On this proposal, the dependence constraint is 
the claim that the normative properties depend on base properties, so understood. Below 
I will also talk of base terms and base concepts. It is an assumption of my argument that 
it is at least possible that normative terms and concepts ascribe normativity involving 
properties.  
 
This version of the dependence constraint looks at least less vulnerable to a potential 
parochiality charge. Non-naturalist realists can accept it. Since normative properties need 
not be normativity involving naturalist realists can accept it too. With ‘properties’ suitably 
construed, so can expressivists (also see below on ascriptive dependence) and error 
theorists should be happy with the claim that it is part of our concept of the normative 
that normative properties depend on base properties, even if no normative properties 
exist.12  
  
The dependence constraint still needs further sharpening. It is common in the 
supervenience literature in metaethics to note a distinction between ontological and 
ascriptive supervenience (Klagge, 1988). Ontological supervenience posits a necessary 
connection between properties. Ascriptive supervenience is about a connection between 
types of judgments. Understood ascriptively, supervenience is the claim that we cannot 
suppose two individuals to differ normatively without taking them to differ in some base 
respect as well.13 There are interesting questions about how the ‘cannot’ here should be 
understood. At the very least we can say that, according to ascriptive supervenience, it is 
inappropriate to treat two items as normatively distinguishable without believing that 
they are also distinguishable in base respects. If two actions are base indistinguishable, 
labeling one as good thereby commits one to labeling the other as good. If you don’t, 
you’ve made some kind of mistake, be that alethic, conceptual, epistemic or normative 
(ethical, in this case) or some combination of these (McPherson, 2015). Those who hold 
this thesis typically take it to be an a priori conceptual truth, a constraint on competence 
with normative concepts. 
 
The dependence constraint as just stated above was the claim, supposedly a conceptual 
truth or truism, that normative properties depend on base properties. This is to claim an 
ontological asymmetric dependence relation between the normative and the base: When 
                                                
11 On McPherson’s version base properties are those that are not ethically involving. Ridge (2007) suggests 
an alternative response to Sturgeon: that the base be characterised as either descriptive or non-normative. I 
agree with McPherson that Sturgeon’s argument puts Ridge’s proposal into doubt (2012 pp. 213 n.23. Cf 
Sturgeon, 2009, pp. 67-9). However, my arguments below also work given this disjunctive construal of the 
base.  
12 Cf Mackie (1977, pp.) “But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?” 
13 Klagge characterises it as the claim that, logically speaking, a person’s judgment of a certain supervening 
kind cannot differ unless judgments of the other kind about things differ. This implies one has to actually 
make the judgments of the other kind, but this seems too strong. There are interesting issues about how 
precisely to characterise ascriptive supervenience, and the relation between ontological and ascriptive 
supervenience, that carry over to dependence. Cf. McPherson (2015). 
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something has a normative property it is because that thing has certain base properties. 
Normative properties obtain in virtue of base properties.  
 
This version of the dependence constraint is purely metaphysical. But in many of the 
examples I gave above, the authors’ discussion of the dependence constraint is framed in 
terms falling on the representational side of things rather than the metaphysical side. 
That is, in terms of ‘judgments’, ‘claims’, ‘moralizing’, ‘concepts’ and ‘formulating 
plans’.14  
 
This suggests an ascriptive understanding of the dependence constraint. Roughly, this is: 
it is conceptual truth, or truism, that when you judge that something has a normative 
property that is because you judge it to have certain base properties; normative 
judgments must be based on the base features we take the objects of our judgments to 
have. If you were to make a normative judgment without taking that judgment to be 
underpinned by certain base features of the object, this would be inappropriate. You 
would be making a mistake. As with ascriptive superveneince, there are various forms 
this mistake might take.  
 
I think that there is evidence that both sorts of dependence constraint, ontological and 
ascriptive, are widely accepted in the metaethics literature. This distinction gives rise to 
different ways we might understand the dependence constraint. I’m going to focus on 
four different versions. 
 
(a) Ascriptive Descriptive: It is a truism that when you make a normative judgment that is 
because you judge there to be certain base properties present. This is how we make 
normative judgments.15 
 
(b) Ascriptive Constitutive: It is a conceptual truth or truism that when you make a 
normative judgment it must be based on the base properties you take the object of your 
judgment to have. This is at least partly constitutive of making a normative judgment.  
 
(c) Ascriptive Normative: It is a conceptual truth or truism that when you make normative 
judgment it must be based on the base properties you take the object of your judgment 
to have. This is how normative judgments must be justified.  
 
(d) Ontological: It is a conceptual truth or truism that normative properties (facts) obtain in 
virtue of base properties (facts). This is a metaphysical thesis that is a constraint on 
competence with normative concepts.16 
 
In what follows, I argue that none of (a)-(d) is a conceptual truth or truism. This is 
because there is at least one metanormative view which is not ruled out by conceptual 
truths, nor obviously false, which can deny each of (a)-(d).  
 
You might think, of course, that in distinguishing these different versions of the 
dependence constraint, I have already done enough to show that there is not one single 
                                                
14 Zangwill and Smith clearly take their versions of the dependence constraint to be closely related to the 
purely metaphysical version, but it is notable that both versions have a distinctively ascriptive flavour. 
15 If this is distinct from b, then it is a contingent claim, which is why I don’t say that it is a conceptual 
truth.  
16 In much the same way as supervenience is often understood. Cf Jackson (1998), Smith (2004), Dreier 
(ms) and many others. 
 7 
version of the dependence constraint that everyone agrees to in metanormative 
theorizing. That would be too quick. First, as with supervenience, there is the general 
assumption that something in the vicinity just must be the case. Second, as I said above, 
expressivists can accept the ontological version as well as the ascriptive version, 
construing ‘properties’ in the appropriate way. Error theorists can accept it too. Realists 
can accept the dependence constraint understood ascriptively. And third, as I said in the 
introduction, what I am really interested in is challenging the notion that it must be the 
case that there are these two realms, one more fundamental than the other, whether the 
relation is understood ascriptively or ontologically. 
 
So why might one think that some version of the dependence constraint is a conceptual 
truth, or truism? Those who explicitly defend this sort of view appeal to observations 
about ordinary normative practice. My strategy will be to argue that appeals to ordinary 
normative practice cannot establish any of (a)-(d).17  
 
III. Against Ascriptive Dependence Constraints 
(a) Ascriptive Descriptive: It is a truism that when you make a normative judgment 
that is because you judge there to be certain base properties present. This is how 
we make normative judgments 
 
It is worth noting that a descriptive claim about how we make normative judgments 
would not by itself establish any of the dependence claims the authors I quote above are 
concerned with (or (b), (c), or (d)).18 However, it is still worth discussing this descriptive 
claim, because it seems to me that many people assume, at least implicitly, that 
something like it is the case. Moreover, if this descriptive version were true that might 
plausibly be some evidence for the truth of some of the more interesting versions of the 
dependence constraint. 
 
However, reflecting on ordinary practice does not reveal that, as a matter of fact, we do 
always make normative judgments in virtue of base features we take the objects of our 
judgments to have. 
 
First, there are many cases where we make the overall judgment first: I immediately judge 
that the building is beautiful, or I have the sense that an argument goes wrong 
somewhere, or that there is something morally dubious about an action. I may, if I spend 
time thinking about it, go on to look for other features in the light of which I find my 
normative judgment appropriate, but I don’t always even do this.  
 
Second, often we appear to make overall judgments on the basis of more specific 
normative judgments, without first making those more specific normative judgments on 
the basis of judgments about base features. Perhaps I judge that the act was wrong 
because it was cruel, or good because kind. These more specific judgments can be 
immediate: I ‘see’ that the act was cruel or kind. But even if they are not immediate in 
this way, these can be made on the basis of still more specific normative judgments: that 
                                                
17 It is difficult to see what else one might appeal to that could give the dependence constraint the requisite 
status. Of course, a particular metanormative view might have certain commitments that generate 
commitment to a dependence constraint, and that view might end up being correct. Nothing that I say 
here rules out that possibility. 
18 Blackburn comes closest to making this descriptive claim, but it is clear from the context that he takes 
ascriptive dependence to be something stronger, i.e. to be constitutive of moralizing, and a conceptual 
constraint. 
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the act was cruel because gratuitously harmful or kind because sensitive and thoughtful. 
It is difficult to see how appeals to ordinary evaluative practice show that we do always 
bottom out in judgments about the base features we take the objects of our normative 
judgments to have.  
 
But perhaps we should not understand Ascriptive Descriptive phenomenologically, as a 
description of a process we are aware of executing each time we make a normative 
judgment. Taking a leaf from Blackburn’s book, perhaps we should think of 
representations of base properties as ‘inputs’ and normative judgments as ‘outputs’ and 
acknowledge, as Blackburn does, that the distinction and the process may not be 
transparent to us. It can seem to me as if I just ‘see’ that the act was cruel, even if actually 
I only make that judgment because of certain base ‘inputs’ I am unaware of. In other 
words, this would be to say that even if we are not consciously aware of it, when we 
make a normative judgment we do so in virtue of base features that we take the objects 
of our judgments to have.  
 
This is certainly possible. But it is difficult to see how appealing to ordinary normative 
practice could establish this claim. It depends on a claim about a process of which we are 
unaware when engaging in ordinary normative practice ourselves and which, presumably, 
others could not observe.19  
 
Turn now to (b): 
 
(b) Ascriptive Constitutive: It is a conceptual truth or truism that when you make a 
normative judgment it must be based on the base properties you take the object 
of your judgment to have. This is at least partly constitutive of making a 
normative judgment.  
 
Given the observations about ordinary normative practice above, this claim needs 
revision. It is implausible to hold that every normative judgment we make must be based 
on the base properties we take the objects of our judgments to have, since many 
normative judgments are, plausibly, based on more specific normative judgments. Unless 
we are illegitimately discounting the possibility of those more specific normative 
judgments ascribing normativity-involving properties, Ascriptive Constitutive is false.  
 
The claim must be, instead as follows: 
 
It is a conceptual truth or truism that when you make a normative judgment it 
must ultimately be based on the base properties you take the object of your 
judgment to have. This is at least partly constitutive of making a normative 
judgment.  
 
Now why hold this? Appealing to observations about ordinary normative practice could 
not establish this. At most such observations could establish the descriptive claim that 
we do in fact ultimately base all our normative judgments on the base properties we take 
the objects of our judgments to have. It is dubitable that this descriptive claim is true, 
given the observations about ordinary normative practice made above.  
 
                                                
19 Blackburn (1998, ch. 1, §2; ch. 4, §4) has an argument for why this must be the case that does not appeal 
to observations about ordinary normative practice that I am appealing to here, but rather to distinctively 
ethical considerations. I address this in my (2013a).  
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To support Ascriptive Constitutive we need an argument which shows that in order for a 
judgment to count as a genuine normative judgment, it is a conceptual truth or truism 
that normative judgments must be ultimately be based on the base properties that the 
judger takes the object of their judgment to have. Either (c) or (d) could be marshaled 
for use as premises in such an argument. For consider that it is highly plausible that a 
necessary condition for a genuine normative judgment is that it be grounded. Imagine an 
individual who claims that a film they have just seen is good, but then goes on to say that 
they have absolutely no reasons for making the claim, or that the film had no features that 
made it good. This would, I think, be evidence for the claim that they are not competent 
with the concept GOOD. Support for Ascriptive Constitutive could perhaps be secured then 
if we could show that it is a conceptual truth or truism that normative judgments must 
be justified, ultimately, by appeal to base features, or that normative properties must 
obtain in virtue of base properties.  
 
So let us consider (c): 
 
(c) Ascriptive Normative: It is a conceptual truth or truism that when you make 
normative judgment it must ultimately be based on the base properties you take 
the object of your judgment to have. This is how normative judgments must be 
justified.  
 
As Smith puts it, it is a conceptual constraint on normative judgments that normative 
claims can’t be barely true; they must always be made true by other claims, ultimately by 
claims about base properties that make the normative claim appropriate. Smith claims that 
this is evident from our ordinary normative practice: there is conceptual pressure to cite 
the features which make your normative claim appropriate, and ultimately those features 
cited must be base features. It is incoherent, he thinks, to suppose otherwise. 
 
But while it is plausible that ordinary practice does establish that normative claims can’t 
be barely true, and that normative judgments can’t be ungrounded, it is not at all clear 
that it shows that normative claims must be made true, ultimately, by claims about base 
properties. Often the grounds we point to for our normative judgments will themselves 
be normative – claims about thick properties for example. Is it a conceptual truth or 
truism that the grounds for thick judgments about thick properties must ultimately be 
judgments about base properties? Why think that justification must bottom out in appeal 
to base properties? Indeed, why think that it is self-evident or obvious, or a conceptual 
truth that the justification for a normative judgment must bottom out in some foundation 
at all?  
 
To illustrate, imagine we set about uncovering the grounds for the claim that an action 
was wrong. It turns out the action was wrong because cruel, and cruel because it involved 
the gratuitous harming of an innocent person.20 Why was it gratuitous? It was unjustified. What 
made it a harm? It involved a malicious deceit which negatively affected the individual’s 
welfare. Why was the person innocent? They hadn’t done anything wrong. Absent any 
further substantive metanormative assumptions, it is perfectly possible that this process 
continues with even further appeal to normative, and thus normativity involving, 
features. It is possible, that is, that the justification for a normative claim is not a matter 
of tracing, in a linear fashion, the grounds for each successive judgment before coming 
to a halt in the foundation of the base.  
                                                
20 I’ve italicised all the (potentially) normative terms.   
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One way in which justification could fail to be foundationalist in this way was if it were 
the case that thick concepts were irreducibly thick. But it will be helpful to first put some 
background in place to be able to explain this view. 
 
Those who hold that thick concepts are irreducibly thick also hold radical holism. (RH) as I 
understand it is a view concerning the ontological dependence relation.  
 
(RH) the properties that make, for example, an act wrong in one case, may not be 
wrong-makers and may even make for a different normative property in a 
different case.21  
 
According to (RH) normative properties are shapeless with respect to the properties on 
which they depend (McDowell, 1981; Dancy, 1993 Ch. 5; Roberts, 2011). On this view 
the commonality or real resemblance between different instances of wrongness is 
irreducibly normative. This is sometimes put as the claim that there is no ‘descriptive 
pattern’ for normative properties (Jackson, Pettit, Smith, 2000). 
 
(RH) is typically taken to have an ascriptive analogue in so far as we have epistemic and 
semantic access to the relevant properties. That is, (restricting the claim to correct 
judgments) when we judge that an act is cruel, for example, the properties that we judge 
to make the act cruel may not be cruel-markers and may even make for a different 
normative property in a different case.  
 
Irreducible thickness (IT) is a view about the nature of thick concepts. Examples of thick 
concepts include KIND, CRUEL, COURAGEOUS, GENEROUS, DISCREET, FRUGAL, SLEAZY 
and TREACHEROUS. (IT) holds that thick concepts and properties are inherently 
evaluative and shapeless with respect to those properties on which they depend. It is not, 
however, merely an instance of radical holism (Roberts, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
On this view, thick concepts are just more specific evaluative concepts, more specific than 
the thin ones, that is. Perhaps there are almost no restrictions on the things that can 
count as BAD, and almost no restrictions on the kinds of features that can make things 
bad; BAD, we can say, operates in a relatively unrestricted domain. What makes CRUEL a 
more specific concept than BAD is that it operates within a narrower domain (Dancy, 
1995). CRUEL applies to actions or people in virtue of those people or actions having 
features of a certain sort. According to (IT) we won’t be able to specify what sort of 
features cruel people and actions must have, and perhaps not even what features they do 
have in a particular case, without using further, more specific evaluative terms. In the 
case of ‘cruel’ these might be, for example, ‘harmful’, ‘gratuitous’ or ‘thoughtless’.  
 
This last point is important: Given the possibility that normative properties are 
normativity involving, on this view there is no guarantee that we will be able to give a 
purely base characterization of the features of the individual in virtue of which the thick 
concept applies. In other words, according to (IT) there is no guarantee that we will be 
able to give a purely base account of the grounds of the thick property. 
 
                                                
21 This could be to hold that the normative grounding relation is not a necessitation relation. (Cf. Dancy’s 
1993, 2004 view of resultance.) In metaphysics, grounding is usually taken to be a necessitation relation but 
there are some dissenters: see Chudnoff (2011; 2013, §6.2), Leuenberger (2014b), Skiles (2015), and Berker 
(m.s.) p35 n59. 
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To make more clear why this is the case, consider the notion of ‘embedded evaluation’ 
(Elstein&Hurka, 2009, pp. 526).22 When it comes to thick terms and concepts, an 
evaluation is global if that evaluation applies to all the features that distinguish the things 
falling under that term or concept. We can contrast this with embedded evaluations, which 
are evaluations required to specify the very thing over which the global evaluation will 
take scope. Take ‘distributively just’ as an example, and assume that ‘x is distributively 
just’ means something like ‘x has features X, Y and Z as a distribution and is good for 
having those features’. The ‘good’ that occurs in the analysis is a global evaluation. An 
embedded evaluation would be present if specifying the type of thing to which the global 
evaluation applies required evaluative information. In this case, if one or more of X, Y, 
or Z were an evaluative feature (e.g. perhaps X is ‘is the result of a fair procedure’) then 
‘distributively just’ would contain an embedded evaluation.  
 
On this view, ‘fair’ on this view would also contain an embedded evaluation or 
evaluations. We thus have no reason to assume in advance in any token case that we will 
be able to identify the base properties in virtue of which an institution, say, is just.23  
 
According to irreducible thickness, the paradigmatic cases of thick concepts contain 
embedded evaluation. Moreover, that embedded evaluation is itself thick, and there is no 
reason to assume, in advance, that there will be a chain of embeddings that bottoms out, 
in some way, in base concepts ascribing base properties.  
 
The salient features of (IT) for this discussion are thus as follows: 
 
(IT) thick concepts and properties are inherently evaluative and shapeless. There 
is no guarantee, in any token case, that we will be able to give a purely base 
characterization of the features of the individual in virtue of which the thick 
concept applies. 
 
As far as possibilities countenanced by our concepts go then, we cannot take it that it 
must be the case that normative judgments must ultimately be grounded in base 
properties that we take the objects of our normative judgments to have.  
 
Moreover, even in the cases where the justification for a normative judgment appears to 
be an appeal to base properties, the fact that these base judgments function as reasons 
might be sufficient to make them normative, and thus possibly normativity involving 
(and so not base). Perhaps you judge that the action was wrong because it caused pain. 
Pain here functions as a wrong-maker, the reason why you judge the act was wrong. The 
claim now is that it couldn’t function as the justification for the wrongness judgment 
without being normative, or perhaps better: normatively relevant. Arguably, normative 
relevance is itself normative. Where there is normativity there is the possibility of 
normativity involving features. Even in simple cases, then, it appears that it is a 
substantive, issue whether or not we bottom out in appeals to base features in the way 
that Ascriptive Normative has it that we must.24  
 
 
 
                                                
22 Elstein&Hurka assume embedded evalutions will be thin, but as far as I can see there is nothing that 
rules out the possibility that they are thick. 
23 Cf. Hurley (1989) ch. 2 
24 Cf. especially Väyrynen (2013), also Korsgaard (1996) and Schroeder (2005). 
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IV. Against the Ontological Dependence Constraint 
(d) Ontological: It is a conceptual truth or truism that normative properties obtain 
in virtue of base properties. This is a metaphysical thesis that is a constraint on 
competence with normative concepts 
 
My main claim in this section is that the discussion in §III reveals that our concepts and 
our normative practice leave open the possibility that no set of base properties could 
ground, in the ontological sense, a normative property.25 
 
The way to bring this out is to first consider a potential objection. In §III I focused on 
ascriptive understandings of the dependence constraint. That is, it was concerned with 
terms, concepts and representations rather than metaphysics. Even if my argument in 
§III is correct and none of (a)-(c) is a conceptual truth or truism, why should that have 
any implications for (d)? After all, it is compatible with the claim that certain base 
properties of an object ground, and thus metaphysically necessitate, its normative 
properties, that no base description will conceptually imply, just as a matter of the 
concepts involved, any particular normative conclusion.26 Perhaps my arguments in §III 
simply trade on the latter, a familiar thought in metaethics, and the same kind of thought 
which supports open question and is-ought gap intuitions. 
 
However, it is important to remember that what I am challenging is the claim that 
Ontological is a conceptual truth or truism. As with the ascriptive versions of the 
dependence constraint, my claim is not that it is false, just that, for all our concepts tell 
us, it could be false. The point is precisely that as far as we can tell from our normative 
concepts and normative practice, the possibility is left open that base properties do not 
metaphysically necessitate normative properties.  
 
But now we need to consider another objection. Why is this news? After all, as I 
mentioned in the introduction, many understand non-naturalist metaethical views 
precisely as claiming that normative properties are not fully grounded in base properties. 
And this is not just a problem for my argument against Ontological. Once we make explicit 
that the notion that we are concerned with here is full, rather than partial grounding, and 
consider that this notion has ascriptive analogues, the non-naturalist need not hold any 
version of the dependence constraint I outline above. §III’s conclusions were not news 
either. 
 
A non-naturalist who thinks along these lines has in mind something like the following: 
 
Whenever an a particular individual has a normative property, there’s always a 
grounding explanation of this fact that cites only base properties of the individual 
together with a general normative principle. Normative properties are always fully 
grounded in base properties plus general normative principles. These general 
principles may themselves be grounded in further principles, but at bedrock there 
is a normative principle (or principles) that ground the particular normative facts 
                                                
25 The grounding literature takes the relata to be facts rather than properties, so I am speaking somewhat 
loosely here. I do this just for ease of exposition. I’m also talking about full rather than partial grounding 
here. Griffin (1992), Raz(2000) and Sturgeon (2009) make somewhat similar claims to the ones I go on to 
make below, but in the context of challenging supervenience.  
26 Cf. Väyrynen (2013) especially p158-161. 
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and mid-level principles, but which are not themselves explained by citing base 
properties (Rosen, ms, pp. 20)27 
 
Recall though that my aim is to challenge the assumption that there are two distinct 
realms with one, the base, more fundamental than the other at least when it comes to 
particular normative facts. This non-naturalist account of the structure of the normative 
does not challenge this assumption. Moreover, although there are irreducible normative 
principles on this account, these principles are akin to bridge laws linking two distinct 
realms, one more fundamental than the other. That is, they take us from the base to the 
normative. For example: ‘If an act has base properties X, Y and Z then it is good’.   
 
This account of the structure of the normative is also a target of my argument. I said in 
the introduction that I aimed to show that when we cull all the normative terms from 
our language, and so the concepts that they express, what we will be left with will not 
necessarily be sufficient to adequately describe, conceptualise or represent what it is that 
we are supposed to be making normative judgments in virtue of. In effect §III does just 
this. If we were to take away all the thick terms, and thus the thick concepts they stand 
for, then, the argument of that section implies, we won’t necessarily be left with the 
requisite resources to adequately describe, conceptualise or represent what it is that we 
are supposed to be making normative judgments in virtue of.  
 
This has metaphysical implications. Appeals to ordinary practice and what is permitted 
by our concepts cannot license the assumption that even if we can’t ascribe the relevant 
properties in base terms, they must nonetheless be base properties. They might be, but 
they might not. This undermines both Ontological as the claim that it is a conceptual truth 
or truism that normative properties must be fully grounded in base properties AND the 
alternative, non-naturalist account of the structure of normative reality outlined above. 
For, given the arguments of §III, we should not assume that we have the linguistic or 
conceptual resources to formulate the relevant principles. This does not mean that we 
should conclude that there are no such principles. But it does mean that we cannot rule 
out the possibility that there are not.  
 
This point about formulating the relevant principles needs more discussion. First (RH) 
may be true. According to (RH) the base properties that make, for example, an act wrong 
in one case, may not be wrong-makers and may even make for a different normative 
property in a different case. Normative properties are shapeless with respect to (the 
relevant subset of) base properties. On this view the commonality or real resemblance 
between different instances of wrongness is normative. This leaves open the conceptual 
possibility that there is no pattern at the base grounding level. Principles (or, at least 
‘snappy’ principles) require that there be such a pattern.28  
 
One might reply that even if (RH) is true there will still be some grounding explanation 
of particular normative facts.  This would cite only base properties of the relevant 
individual-in-a-world together with a general, perhaps infinitely complex, conditional, 
whether or not we want to call this conditional a (non-snappy) principle.29 So the 
                                                
27 Cf. Enoch (2011), Scanlon (2014), Schroeder (2014), Skarsaune (2015). 
28 Cf. Rosen (m.s.) p2 n1, Jackson, Pettit and Smith (2000). The latter argue that there must be such a 
pattern otherwise we wouldn’t be able to acquire the relevant concepts. However, their argument depends 
on the assumption that naturalism is true. See Dancy (1999), Roberts (2016). 
29 If (RH) is the case, and we wanted the guarantee – what a principle would give us – that a particular 
normative property would be instantiated by an individual then we would need to include at least every base 
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grounds for the wrongness of an action in a particular case would be all of the base 
properties of the action including all of the base properties of the entire world in which 
the action is situated, as relational properties of that action, plus a conditional stating that 
actions with these base properties are wrong.30 
 
However, given the possibility of (IT) it is not clear that we would even be able to 
formulate this base description of the individual-in-a-world plus general, perhaps infinitely 
complex, conditional, in such a way that the instantiation of the normative property is 
indeed necessitated. For this would require that we could do precisely what (IT) says there 
is no guarantee that we can always do, that is, that we be able to give an account purely in 
base terms of the grounds of any and all thick properties of this individual-in-a-world. 
And if we can’t formulate it, I can’t think what metanormatively neutral reason we have 
to say that it must nonetheless be there. 
  
 
V. Conclusion  
It is worth emphasizing that I am not denying that normative judgments or normative 
properties are dependent. As I said above, it is highly plausible that necessary condition 
for a normative judgment is that it be grounded. An individual who claims that a person 
is cowardly, but then goes on to say that they have absolutely no reasons for making the 
claim, or that the person has no features that make them cowardly would plausibly not be 
competent with COWARD. It is also equally plausible that normative properties cannot 
‘float free’. They must be grounded in other features that the relevant object has. Indeed, 
I think it is plausible to hold that each of these dependence claims, the one about 
judgments and the one about properties, is a conceptual truth or a genuine truism. 
 
What I have argued is that it is implausible to hold that it is a conceptual truth or truism 
that normative judgments and properties are grounded in base judgments and base 
properties, respectively (where ‘base’ means ‘not normativity involving’ as specified 
above). This is so not because normative judgments and properties might be partially 
grounded in normative principles, but because it is possible that more specific, thick, 
normative judgments and properties are to be found all the way down the grounding chain, 
so to speak.  
 
I suspect that many will find the ascriptive version of this thick grounding claim easier to 
swallow than the ontological version. For there is no reason to assume that if there is an 
ontological normative – base distinction, with the base the more fundamental, that this 
distinction will be found near the surface of language.31  
 
As far as the ontological version of my thick grounding claim is concerned, the crucial 
issue is whether, in order to count as a base property, we must be able to ascribe and not 
                                                                                                                                      
property of the world in which the individual was situated, as relational properties of that individual, as part 
of the grounds. 
30 There is an interesting question here concerning whether this would amount to an explanation of the 
particular normative fact (grounding is after all supposed to be metaphysical explanation). This point is 
related to Dancy’s claim that the grounding relation, as far as the normative is concerned, is not a 
necessitation relation at all. The resultant base for the normative property does not necessitate that 
property, on his view. Dancy holds this because he holds (RH), or something close to it. And he thinks 
that to include all of the properties of the entire world in which the individual is situated in the base is to 
fail to single out the wrong-makers, or right-makers or whatever the relevant normative property may be. On 
the face of it, this looks like a failure to explain what needs to be explained.  
31 Cf. Williams (1985) p144. 
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merely denote that property in base terms.32 It’s certainly at least possible that this is a 
reasonable criterion for a property to count as base. Thus, it is possible that more 
specific normative properties are to be found all the way down.  
 
Showing that this is merely possible might not seem to show very much. However, this is 
to ignore the deeply entrenched nature of the dependence constraint (and, relatedly, the 
supervenience constraint). Something like it is assumed at the outset in very many 
discussions in metanormative theory. If I am correct this is, almost always, dialectically 
inadmissible.33 34  
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